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I.  Introduction 
 
There are long, (and often variable), lags between a change in interest rates and its effect on 
real output and inflation.  Hence policy should be based on forecasts, (King 2000).  So the 
eventual out-turn, e.g. for output and inflation, is a complex combination of the skills of the 
forecaster, the response of the policy-makers to the forecasts (and to their other, possibly 
private, sources of information), and the impact of shocks which were unforeseen at the time 
of the forecast.  The aim of this paper is to try to disentangle this mixture in the particular 
case of the Bank of England, and thereby to assess the skills of the forecasters, the adequacy 
of the response of the monetary authorities, and the time path of shocks which were 
unanticipated at the time of the original forecasts. 
                                                 
1  My thanks are due to O. Aspachs for excellent research assistance and to C. Bean 
and G. Wood for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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For most countries this exercise is, alas, impossible.  Official forecasts are not published in 
many, perhaps most, cases.  In other cases, where forecasts are published, they are described 
as `staff forecasts’, and there is a careful distinction drawn between such `staff forecasts’ and 
the beliefs about the future of the policy-makers themselves, e.g. in the ECB or FOMC.  In 
yet other cases the conditional assumption about the future path of interest rates on which the 
forecast is based is not revealed, so no one can tell whether changes to subsequent forecasts 
(and to the out-turn) are due to policy shifting from its previous assumed path, or to an 
(unanticipated) shock to other inputs to the forecast, (e.g. Bank of Canada). 
 
Fortunately these problems do not exist in the UK, at least not to the same extent.  The 
forecasts for output and inflation are not only published, but, even though the more 
mechanical work in their production is done by the staff, the forecast is officially that of the 
Monetary Policy Committee itself.2  Moreover, the conditional assumed path for interest rates 
over the two year horizon of the published forecast, (i.e. no future change) is made 
abundantly clear. 
 
 
2  Of course some of the nine members may have individual reservations and 
qualifications, some of which are at times reported in the Inflation Report, (notably in Table 
6B in previous issues of this Report). 
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There is another complication that, almost always, arises in the assessment of forecast 
accuracy.  This is that some of the actual data, e.g. for output, are subject to continuous 
subsequent revision.3 Fortunately for macro-economic research workers in the UK, the Bank 
has now provided spread sheet (Excel) data on real output values for each generation of 
estimates from 1961 to 2001 Q3, (see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Spring 2001, p. 
42, `Building a real-time database for GDP(E)’ and its website, 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/gdpdatabase).  This allows the research worker to 
choose which generation of estimate to use, but does not resolve the question of what actually 
is the best choice.  This choice, in some large part, relates to the question of what the 
forecaster is trying to forecast; is she trying to forecast the first `flash’ estimate, which is 
known to be estimated with a large and erratic error, containing both much noise and bias; or 
the likely estimate after about one year; or the likely eventual estimate after some 5/10 years. 
 In practice, early estimates have consistently tended to be revised upwards over time, but the 
scale of bias is unknown, and the Office for National Statistics has been trying to reduce the 
scale of the bias. 
 
My own belief, though others may think differently, is that forecasters are trying to estimate 
the out-turn that will be perceived in the data shortly after the `flash estimates’ have settled 
down, say some two or three quarters (6-9 months) after the first estimate becomes available. 
 So I have used the Bank website data to construct the series of output growth shown in Table 
1.  This is compared with the latest series of output growth available at end 2003.  An earlier 
version of this paper was done with the latest series for output growth, rather than the 
 
3  See Statistics Commission, (2004), Revisions to Economic Statistics, Vols 1, 2 and 
3. 
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contemporaneous data.  This did not change the results significantly, in contrast to the 
exercises done by Orphanides (1998) when examining US policy in the 1970s.   Fortunately 
the data for RPI(X), which forms our inflation data series, have not been subject to such 
revisions; the first reported outturn figure remains unchanged. 
 
Most forecasters in the UK, outside the Bank, such as the National Institute, base their 
forecasts on their best guesstimates of future official policies, notably for interest rates and 
fiscal policies.  These usually involve an expectation that interest rates and fiscal policies will 
change in future; whereas the Bank assumes not only that interest rates will remain 
unchanged (at the level announced just after the MPC meeting before the Inflation Forecast is 
revealed), but also that fiscal policy remains as set out in the latest Budget.  Any assessment 
of the accuracy of such external (i.e. non-Bank) forecasts should, in principle, take account of 
the deviations in actual policy from that on which the initial forecast was based.  But since 
the forecasts for future (monetary and fiscal) policies are subject to continuous change from 
one forecast to another, (and in some cases not clearly expressed), this would be a tedious 
and complex exercise which is rarely, if ever, undertaken.  Hence deviations between forecast 
and outcome are some complicated combination which cannot be easily disentangled of 
forecast error, policy revision and unforeseen shock.  As I hope to demonstrate in Section 3, 
it is considerably easier to make a separation between these factors in the case of the MPC of 
the Bank of England. 
 
The operation of, and the justification for, the constant interest rate assumption are not 
generally well understood, (despite my own best efforts, e.g. Goodhart (2001 and 2004a)).  It 
is, therefore perhaps, worthwhile to provide a short reprise of such operations.  The forecasts 
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are presented quarterly in February, May, August and November.  The work on the forecasts 
starts in the previous month, and is then based on the interest rate set by the MPC at that 
month’s meeting (e.g. at the January MPC meeting for the February forecast), and is assumed 
unchanged over the (reported)4 two-year horizon of the forecast.  The time-path for output, 
inflation, etc., from this forecast, based on last month’s interest rate, (conditionally assumed 
unchanged), is then a key input into the MPC meeting just prior to the Inflation Report and its 
published forecast. 
 
If the forecast based on last month’s interest rate shows inflation to be too high (low), then 
there will be pressure on the MPC to raise (lower) interest rates to return inflation to target, 
(from its start in May 1997 until November 2003, the target was to achieve an annual growth 
of RPIX of 2.5%).  If interest rates are thereby changed by the decision of the MPC at this 
                                                 
4  An unchanged nominal interest leads, eventually, to Wicksellian instability.  So for 
longer forecasts, which are often done in the Bank, the unchanged interest rate assumption is 
replaced, at some point after the two-year horizon, with a (stabilising) Taylor-type reaction 
function assumption. 
 
A further problem of the constant interest rate (CIR) assumption is that this usually differs 
from the future time path of official rates expected by the market.  This then involves the 
forecasters in the Bank having to assume (e.g. for the purpose of estimating exchange rate 
movements) that the market has to adjust to systematic errors over time.  While this is not a 
comfortable, nor elegant, procedure, there is considerable evidence that money markets have 
not, in practice, been good predictors of future official interest rates; for the USA, see 
Diebold and Li (2003), Duffee (2002), Carriero et al. (2003), Rudebusch (2002) and 
Rudebusch and Wu (2004); for Japan, see Thornton (2004).  
 
Partly because of such problems, the Bank also reports a forecast based on existing money 
market rates in the Inflation Report (IR).  Some members of the MPC may give as much, or 
more, weight to this forecast as to the CIR forecast.  It would be interesting, and desirable in 
principle, to do the same exercise for the MMR exercise as is done here for the CIR forecast. 
 But that would involve a major additional research exercise to recover the money market 
future implied rate path on each forecasting occasion, and the implied central point estimates 
for inflation and output growth.  While the Bank of England may have sufficient resources 
for this exercise, it is beyond my own capabilities. 
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meeting, the forecast is then immediately re-worked to incorporate this new level of short-
term interest rates, which then again is assumed to be left unchanged over the eight quarter 
horizon of the forecast. 
 
When on the MPC, I construed my obligation to achieve the Chancellor’s remit as being to 
set interest rates so that the (median) forecast for inflation in the final half-year of the two 
year forecast period (i.e. seven and eight quarters hence, t+7, t+8) closely approximated to 
2.5%.  Others, e.g. Vickers (1999) have publicly denied that there was ever such a clear, or 
maintained, rule of thumb; certainly interpretations of how best to deliver the Chancellor’s 
remit varied amongst MPC members.  That said, my own empirical study of the MPC’s 
forecasts in `What is the Monetary Policy Committee trying to achieve’ (2004a) shows that 
these have remained closely consistent with my own approach.  The modal forecasts of RPIX 
forecast at t+7 and t+8 from Q3 1997 till Q3 2003 have averaged 2.5 and 2.6 respectively 
with standard errors of 0.2 in both cases, (compared with outcomes for the same period 
averaging 2.4 with an SE of 0.4).  At t+7, the maximum modal forecast was 2.80 (1998 4) 
and the minimum 2.19 (2001 3); for t+8, the figures are 2.90 (1999 1&2) and 2.35 (2000 2). 
 
One caveat needs to be stated.  The period, 1997-2003, was one of extraordinary stability in 
the UK economy, (Benati 2003).  Shocks were relatively mild, and necessary interest rate 
adjustments (to hit the 2.5% target) small.  If really large supply-side shocks were to affect 
the UK economy adversely, the speed of return to the inflation target, and the extent of short-
term interest rate adjustment would, indeed, then depend on the marginal rates of substitution 
and transformation between output and inflation, as set out in Bean (2003); and the analysis 
and resulting forecasts would be laid out in the necessarily accompanying MPC letter to the 
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Chancellor.  But so far, no letter has needed to be written, and the process has remained 
comfortably as described above. 
 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows.  In Section 2 we describe our data base, and 
report some, relatively simple, characteristics of the Bank’s forecasts.  In Section 3 we use 
the Bank/MPC forecasts to try to disentangle forecast error, unanticipated shocks and policy 
response, and to assess how successful the forecasters/policy makers have been.  Section 4 
concludes. 
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II.  The Data and some Characteristics of the Forecasts 
 
Forecasts for future inflation (RPIX) have been made in the Inflation Report by the Bank 
since 1993 Q1.  Initially they were for the current quarter (t = 0), (remember that the forecast 
is completed in the middle month of each quarter), and the next six, or seven, quarters (t = 6, 
t = 7).  Then in 1995 Q3, the forecast horizon was extended to, and has remained as, eight 
quarters (t = 8).  The Inflation Report itself, intentionally, does not publish point figures; 
instead it gives a probability distribution, which in the case of the inflation forecast is 
colloquially named `Rivers of Blood’ from its regular red colour and river-delta shape.  Of 
course, the associated central tendencies, the mode, median and mean exist, and after a short 
delay (whose objective is to focus attention on the distribution, not the point forecast(s)), 
these are made publicly available by the Bank on its website (www.bankofengland.co.uk).  
Initially, before 1995 Q1, the distribution was assumed to be symmetrical, so all three central 
tendencies were identical.  Thereafter, a measure of skew, (as well as of uncertainty), is 
reported, together with separate figures for the mean, median and mode.  We use the modal 
forecast throughout.  In practice, see Goodhart (2004a), the skews in the forecast have been 
quite small, so there would not, we believe, be much difference if we used the mean or 
median instead.  As already stated, the actual data, for the RPI(X) series, taken from standard 
ONS series, once published are not revised.  These data are shown in Table 2 below.  The 
forecasts relating to each consecutive out-turn date are shown horizontally.  Thus the forecast 
at t = 8 for 2003 Q3 (2.45) was made in 2001 Q3, at t = 7 (2.23) in 2001 Q4, and for t = 0 
(2.85) in August 2003, and compares with the out-turn of 2.80. 
 
Although the Bank, obviously, made forecasts of the associated predicted (growth rates of) 
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real GDP, it did not publish them in its Inflation Report until it was granted operational 
independence in May 1997; so the first published forecasts, (for the distribution of the growth 
of real GDP in the Inflation Report), date from 1997 Q3.  Although it may be possible at 
some future date for researchers to get hold of (so far) unpublished details of the Bank’s 
internal forecasts for earlier years, in this case I have preferred to work with the existing 
published forecast data, despite the resulting short time series.  These forecasts are shown in 
Table 1 in exactly the same format as for inflation, except that we also show the series for 
both the contemporaneous, and the latest available output data.  As indicated earlier we shall 
focus on the relationship between the contemporaneous and the forecast output series. 
 
The other data series that we utilise is that for official short-term interest rates.  This is taken 
from standard sources.  A chart of the path of interest rates since 1983 is given below. 
 
[Insert Chart 1] 
 
The main quality that most forecasters seek is accuracy and lack of bias.  Thus the most 
common analytical data provided are the measures of Mean Average Error (MAE), Root 
Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and bias, i.e. the average deviation of out-turn from forecast 
(and the significance of such bias).  These data are provided on a regular basis by the Bank 
on its website.5 
                                                 
5  An example from the Bank is: 
 
RPIX Inflation Errors 
 
 
 
Average Error 
 
Average Absolute 
Error 
 
Sample Size 
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One-year-ahead errors 
Constant rate mode 
Constant rate mean 
Market rate mode 
Market rate mean 
 
 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
 
 
20 
20 
18 
18 
 
Two-year-ahead errors 
Constant rate mode 
Constant rate mean 
Market rate mode 
Market rate mean 
 
 
-0.3 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.3 
 
 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
 
 
16 
16 
14 
14 
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I have some doubts whether such measures represent a fully satisfactory depiction of the 
accuracy of the forecasts.  If the series being forecast, i.e. the rate of growth -the % change - 
in prices (RPI) and output (GDP), are stationary (IO) over the relevant time period, and the 
mean-reverting forces, whether from fundamentals or policy measures, have been quite 
strong, than a forecast that inflation (real growth) will remain at its trend level will be 
relatively accurate, even it provides no useful prediction whatsoever of the fluctuations of the 
forecasted variable around its mean trend. 
 
Consider Chart 2 below.  Forecast 1 is just a constant growth rate; forecast 2 tracks the 
fluctuations of the variable under consideration exactly, except for a constant bias.  In terms 
of bias, forecast 2 is, by construction, worse, and one can set it so that it is identical to 
forecast 1 in terms of accuracy (MAE or RMSE).  Yet in terms of giving some indication of 
where the economy is heading, relative to trend, the latter forecast (2) is surely more helpful. 
 
[Insert Chart 2] 
 
There is some (slight) evidence that the forecasts imply a closer adherence to (average past) 
trends than the outturns exhibited.  This is indeed largely inevitable.  The expectation of a 
variable will be more stable than its actual value, since shocks are by definition 
unpredictable.  Even so, in a period of mean reversion to a stable trend, a forecast can be 
accurate while possessing zero predictive power, e.g. as compared with a constant. 
 
In Table 3 below we show data for the mean values, and standard deviations, of the outturns 
and forecasts for both our series. 
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[Insert Table 3] 
 
Note that the modal forecast for RPI is almost perfectly in line with outturn for the Bank, but 
that the variance around the mean is lower in the more distant forecasts (t = 7/t = 8), though 
not so at the shorter horizon.   
 
There is a rather curious pattern in the forecasts of output, though this could be due to the 
short sample and particular features of the period, (e.g. uncomfortably high real exchange 
rates, expected to depreciate slowly over time).  This pattern is that near-term forecasts (t = 0 
till t = 4) tend to underestimate actual growth, (even more so for subsequent revised figures 
for real growth), but from t = 4 onwards the forecasters became more optimistic (on average) 
about growth prospects, so by the end of the horizon (t + 7, t + 8) the prediction was normally 
for growth to be at, or slightly above, its longer-run trend.  Again, as with inflation, as the 
horizon lengthened, the variance of the forecast declined.  The forecasters consistently tended 
to predict the economy reverting to slightly above trend growth at the longest horizons. 
Effectively the forecasters tend to predict a reversion to trend growth, for GDP and inflation, 
at distant horizons, with increasing divergence from the trend as the horizon shortens.  The 
trend for inflation is forecast pretty accurately, especially after 1993; less so the trend for 
output.  This naturally leads on to the question of whether the forecasts have predictive power 
when a constant term is added to the regression. 
 
The regression for RPI was,  
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Actual = a + b Forecast(t + I), 
and the results were, (p values in brackets):- 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Similarly the regression for Output Growth was:- 
Actual = 0 = a + b Forecastt+i;  
the results were, (p values in brackets), 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The results of these regressions at first glance appear dire.  The R2 values for the RPI 
regression (Table 6) are below 0.2 at longer horizons until the forecast made at t = 1, and the 
b coefficient below 0.5 until t = 0.  Similarly the Bank’s forecast for output growth has an R2 
and b values of virtually zero until t = 1.  
 
To put it bluntly, the Bank does not appear to be able to provide any predictive guide at all to 
the fluctuations of output growth, or inflation, around its trend over a year in advance; it is 
only really in the last couple of quarters before the outturn that the forecasts have any 
predictive value for fluctuations around the trend.  
 
But how should we interpret such apparent predictive `failure’?  Does it imply that the 
forecasts are just `no good’ until near the outcome date; and hence that such forecasts should 
be abandoned, thereby saving resources?  If the forecasts were forecasts for the weather, i.e. a 
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variable whose outcome cannot be affected by the forecasters’ own action, the above 
condemnation would stand.  Forecasts at horizons greater than t = 4 would be a waste of 
time; it would be just as good to assume that the average weather pattern will prevail. 
 
This, however, is not the case for forecasts of output growth and inflation.  The purpose of 
the forecast is to inform policy-makers on how to vary their instruments, short-term interest 
rates in the case of the MPC, so as to drive the output gap and the deviation of inflation from 
target down to zero.  The purpose of forecasting, certainly at the Bank and also, though 
perhaps to a lesser degree, among private sector forecasters, is to inform policy so as to drive 
output growth (or gap) and inflation back to its (desired) trend level.  If this is done perfectly, 
then the value of R2 at the forecast date should be zero, not unity!  If the resultant policy 
change is overdone, the b values would be negative.  The less that the forecast (correctly) 
induces a policy response, the closer will the expected values of R2 and b return to unity.  If 
there is no policy response at all to the forecast, we are back effectively to our weather 
forecasting simile.  All this is perfectly well known in theory and in principle, (e.g. Tobin 
1970; Buiter 1984).  It is quite rare, however, to see a documented, empirical example in 
practice. 
 
Why then do we see the forecasts increasingly exhibiting the ability to predict fluctuations 
around the trend as the horizon shortens?  A possible answer, of course, is that lags, which 
are themselves subject to uncertainty, in the transmission mechanism make it impossible, 
and/or undesirable (for a variety of reasons which we will not restate here) to use interest rate 
policy to offset short-term shocks.  If interest rates could be effectively used 
contemporaneously and instantaneously to affect output and inflation, (as is assumed in many 
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models), then the R2 of forecasts should be zero at all horizons, including t = 0. 
 
The question of what one might expect for the b coefficient is more complicated.6  Suppose 
that y(t) = a + bx(t) + e(t), where x is the (unconditional) forecast, y the outturn, and e an 
unobserved shock, so that a=0 and b=1 (ie these are unbiased forecasts).  Now assume that 
policy is set in order to ensure x(t) = y*.  Then indeed y(t) = y* + e(t), which might lead one 
to expect that a=y* and b=0.  However, notice that y(t) = a + bx(t) + e(t) with a=0 and b=1 
should fit the data just about as well, as indeed does any linear combination of the two 
regressions.  The point is that x(t) and the constant become almost perfectly collinear, so 
when b rises (falls) the coefficient a declines (rises), and the standard errors on the 
coefficients increase.  This is exactly what we find in our regressions. 
 
One basic message is that the shorter (longer) the lag before the instrument affects the 
objective variable, the shorter (longer) is the horizon over which deviations from trend 
should become reasonably predictable. 
 
                                                 
6  I am indebted to C. Bean for this analysis. 
The normal empirical finding is that the lag before interest rates affect output is shorter than 
that for inflation.  So, what we should see is that longer horizon forecasts for inflation are 
rather better, by our criteria of R2 and b coefficient closer to unity, than for output growth.  
Whilst the differences between the forecasting characteristics (for inflation and output 
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growth) are not strong, they do tend in the direction hypothesized.  With the Bank forecasts, 
all the coefficients for inflation, out to t = 8, are positive, and most are weakly significantly 
different from zero.  In the output forecast, the coefficients on the output forecast, b, are 
mostly negative until t = 2.  Similarly the R2 values for inflation are low, around 0.1 until t = 
2, (but this at least is better than the value of less than 0.1 for output until t = 1. 
 
To conclude, and summarise this Section, the traditional measures of forecasting accuracy, 
e.g. MAE, RMSE, unbiassedness, can be met well enough, especially during periods of 
stability, by forecasting that the relevant variables will return to their average trend.  This is, 
in effect, what the forecasters at the Bank did at the longer horizons since 1993.  If one 
instead, as here, examines the more testing criteria, whether the forecasters could predict the 
fluctuations around the trend, the results demonstrate virtually zero ability to do so, until the 
horizons become rather short, t = 3 or lower, too late to take countervailing action. 
 
But that latter qualification is crucial.  If no countervailing action is possible, (as with 
forecasts of weather, earthquakes, etc.), then failure to forecast fluctuations is pure failure.  
But if counter-vailing action is possible, then the initial (ex ante, prior to the MPC decision) 
forecast has the key role of informing policy actions.  Those policy actions should offset 
deviations from target (desired trend), eliminating predicted deviations, until the lags in the 
transmission mechanism make that impossible; so that the ex post forecasts (prepared after 
the resulting MPC decision), which is what are published in the Inflation Report, and what 
we show here, should, at the longer horizons, show no correlation between current 
fluctuations (from target) in output growth and inflation and prior longer-term predictions of 
those same variables.  Thus our results in this Section, of R2 and b coefficients of 
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approximately zero for output growth until t = 3, and low for inflation forecasts until short 
horizons could be seen as evidence of the optimal inter-play of forecasting and policy 
response, not as evidence of lousy forecasting ability. 
 
We turn next to a study of the interaction of forecasts, unforeseen shocks and the policy 
response in greater detail in Section III. 
 
III.  The Interplay of Forecast, Policy Response and Shocks 
 
In the attempted quantification in this Section, we have two enormous advantages.  First the 
forecast time pattern of short-term interest rates is always known, i.e. that it should remain 
constant at the level set at the latest MPC meeting, until the end of the forecast period.  
Second, the MPC commissioned, and published under their own aegis, an assessment of The 
Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy (pamphlet, Bank of England, 1999)7, which 
gave, p. 12, pictorial representations of  
(i)  Chart 1 - Effect on real GDP, relative to base, of 100 basis point increase in the 
official rate maintained for one year 
                                                 
7  For a similar exercise for the Euro-zone, see McAdam and Morgan (2004). 
(ii) Chart 2 - Effect on inflation rate, relative to base, of 100 basis point increase in the 
official rate maintained for one year 
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No doubt such assessments differ between members of the MPC, and over time, but this 
study does provide a rough and ready rule of thumb for quantifying what effect MPC 
members thought that they would have on inflation and output, when they contemplated 
interest rate changes.  However, the pamphlet gives a pictorial representation, not a numerical 
quantification.  I have attempted to translate such pictures into approximate mean effects in 
Table 6 below by eye.  Moreover, the exercise above involved a one year change in interest 
rates, whereas in this exercise I am considering the effect of a change maintained for the full 
two year horizon of the forecast.  That does not affect the estimates of the effect on RPI, 
since the lags appear to be so lengthy8, but it does require an adjustment to the estimates for 
the effect on output growth.  The roughly calculated effects on GDP of an interest rate 
change lasting just one year are shown in brackets in Table 6, while the, again roughly 
estimated, effects of such a change held throughout the whole two-year forecast horizon are 
shown in the row above.  Furthermore interest rates can be, and sometimes are, changed each 
calendar month, (at that month’s MPC meeting, generally on the Thursday after the first 
Monday of each month), and not just at the quarterly MPC meeting associated with the 
forecast and Inflation Report.  So there is a need to allocate the effect of each month’s change 
to a starting quarter.  This also is shown in Table 6. 
                                                 
8  The Bank of England has introduced a new quarterly model, (BEQM, see News 
Release on April 22, 2004), in which the responses to interest rate changes of inflation 
(somewhat quicker) and of output (somewhat larger) are slightly different from those used in 
this paper.  See the article on `The new Bank of England Quarterly Model’, accompanying 
the News Release, and available on its website, especially Charts 1 and 2, p. 5. 
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In Table 6, I set out the rule of thumb effects of interest rates out to t = 7, not to the longest 
forecast horizon of t = 8.  This is because I take this initial forecast, at t = 8; as the initial 
starting point, or datum.  Changes from one forecast round to another in this initial forecast 
are a complex mixture of revisions in forecasting technology, views about the interpretation 
of residuals in the equation, shocks and policy responses during the last three months, and I 
do not want to get involved in unscrambling that. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
That said, the forecasts, at t = 8, have not varied much over time.  As shown in Table 3 
above, the Bank’s modal forecast for inflation (Ave 2.6, S.E. 0.2) and for output growth 
(Ave. 2.6, S.E. 0.3) have remained very close to the (ex post) trend.  Moreover that has been 
possible without the MPC feeling obliged to make large, or larger than average, changes in 
interest rates at those MPC meetings which occur towards the end of each forecasting round. 
 This period has been one of remarkable stability.  In our main time-period, 1997-2003, the 
forecasters have usually seen the economy reverting close to trend at the longest horizon 
reported.  Thus almost all of the action from unforeseen shocks to the economy occurs in the 
interval between the initial forecast, at t = 8, and the final outcome, when it is known, in t = 
0; and this is what we shall now focus upon. 
 
So I take the sum of all interest changes in the months in each quarter, (n.b. as set out in the 
bottom of Table 6), and then used the rules of thumb at the top of that same Table to allocate 
the effect of such changes onto subsequent quarters for inflation, (Table 7) and output, (Table 
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8).  Note that the longest forecast horizon did not become t = 8 until 1997 Q3.  Prior to that 
they usually stopped at t = 7 (see Table 1); which explains why column 7 of Tables 7 and 8 is 
blank until 1997 Q3. 
 
[Insert Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10] 
 
Tables 7 and 8 then show, from 1994 Q3 onwards the ‘rule of thumb’ effects of policy, in the 
guise of interest rate changes, on the outcomes for inflation and output.  So we know, or can 
estimate, first, the initial, longest horizon forecast, second, the outcome (subject to the 
previous qualifications about output), and third, the intervening policy response.  The 
remainder, the residual, will represent primarily the unforeseen shocks that will have affected 
the UK economy in the intervening period, (the forecasting technology in the Bank remained 
much the same over the whole period). 
 
We show this for inflation in Table 9 and for output in Table 10.  Table 10 only starts in 1999 
Q3 because forecasts were only published from 1997 Q3 onwards, so the forecast at t = 8, 
made in 1997 Q3, relates to 1999 Q3.  A positive value for ‘policy change’ implies that the 
sum of the effects of interest rate changes between t = 8 and t = 0 was expansionary (on 
inflation/output).  We show, in column 2, the difference between the outcome, for RPIX 
(Table 9) and output growth (Table 10) and the concurrent forecast at t = 0.  As already 
noted, for output growth this difference has quite a large average value, 0.22, an even larger 
Standard Error (0.37) and some residual first order auto-correlation.  The forecasters find it 
hard to predict current growth, even in the middle month of the quarter itself.  Whereas for 
inflation the difference at t = 0 was on average tiny, and randomly distributed.  Then we 
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show the difference between the forecasts at t = 8 and t = 0.  This difference has a strong 
first-order positive auto-correlation (0.51, p = 0.004 for inflation; 0.42, p = 0.06 for output).  
We can then divide this into the accumulated policy response (as estimated) and therefore the 
residual forecast change, primarily from intervening unforeseen shocks.  Again both the 
policy responses, and the unforeseen shocks, show strong first-order positive autocorrelation. 
 For inflation, the patterns of auto-correlation are shown in Table 11; and for output in Table 
12. 
 
[Insert Table 11 and Table 12] 
 
It is probably easiest to read off what was happening from Table 10 for output changes.  Start 
with 1999 Q3.  The forecast made in August 1997 largely failed to see the adverse effects of 
the 1997/98 Asian crisis, and so the residual forecasting change (from Q3 1997 to Q3 1999) 
was a large reduction in output of 1.7, offset by the expansionary effect of policy over the 
same period of 0.36.  As forecasts were made, subsequent to 1997 Q3, the impact of the 
Asian crisis was increasingly factored in (small negative forecast changes), whilst the 
accumulated policy response became for a short period over-done, so that the subsequent 
growth of output, i.e. at end 1999 and the start of 2000, temporarily overshot trend.  By 1999 
Q1 the conclusion of the Asian crisis and the start of the dot.com boom began to be seen, so 
that the t = 8 forecasts for 2001 showed strong output predictions.  Indeed the dot.com boom 
drove output above forecast for a time at the end of 2000, start of 2001.  This led 
appropriately to a reversal of policy, where the accumulated effects became negative 
(tightening), with effect from Q1 2000. 
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The dot.com bubble burst in 2000/2001 with the result that out-turns then systemically fell 
below the earlier t = 8 forecasts9 ever since 2001 Q1, by as much as 0.95% in 2002 Q2.  Thus 
the intervening forecast changes, the unanticipated shocks, were persistently (and strongly 
autocorrelated) negative.  The policy response was, perhaps, a bit slow to catch on to the 
change in conditions, with accumulated tightening effects predominantly until 2001 Q3.  
Thereafter, however, the policy response was, correctly, expansionary, offsetting some, but 
by no means all, of the unanticipated shocks. 
 
Note that the policy change offsets (i.e. has the opposite sign to) the unanticipated forecast 
change in 14 of the 17 observations, a rather good record.  What appears to be less 
praiseworthy, however, is that the policy response offset appears to be only partial.  
Regressing the policy change on the forecast change in the equation over our period, 1999 
Q3/2003 Q3:- 
Policy Change = a + b Forecast Change 
we find a = 0.13 b = -0.26 R2 = 0.27 
     (0.11)       (0.11) 
 
The other main problem is that the forecast deviations from actual (the forecasting errors) are 
strongly positively auto-correlated, even after internalising the policy response.  We show the 
pattern of such forecast errors in Table 13.  Whether one looks across the Table, i.e. 
 
9  Though this was also partly due to the forecasters persistently tending to predict a 
considerable acceleration in output growth towards the end (i.e. t = 7, t = 8) of most forecast 
periods. 
 − 23 − 
 
consecutive forecast errors relating to the same  
 
[Insert Table 13] 
 
 
outcome date; or down the Table, forecast errors at the same horizon relating to consecutive 
outcome dates, the pattern of similar signs, positive following positive, negative following 
negative recurs.  This is shown below:- 
 
 
First order auto-correlations 
 
First order auto-correlations of the forecast errors going downwards: 
  
T= 
 
8 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0  
 
 
 
0.80 
 
0.70  
 
0.76 
 
0.75 
 
0.73 
 
0.74 
 
0.64 
 
0.39 
 
0.35 
 
 
First order auto-correlations of forecast errors going horizontally: 
  
T= 
 
8/7 
 
7/6 
 
6/5 
 
5/4 
 
4/3 
 
3/2 
 
2/1 
 
1/0  
 
 
 
0.950 
 
0.957 
 
0.968 
 
0.957 
 
0.955 
 
0.930 
 
0.917 
 
0.892 
 
Data: Bank forecasts errors of the GDP.   
 
The decline, going horizontally, i.e. successive similar errors in forecasting the same output 
growth, (from about +0.95 to about +0.90), is less marked than the decline going downwards.   In 
this latter case, for successive forecast errors at the same horizon, the auto-correlation falls from 
about +0.8 to about +0.4.   
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If the Bank forecasters have made an initial forecast error, they will tend to repeat that over time, 
despite the Bank policy makers on each occasion tending to make a correctly signed, but small, 
policy response to offset the apparent deviations from target. 
Let us turn next to the patterns of the inflation forecasts, policy responses and forecast errors.   
The initial forecast for RPIX has been on average slightly above the outcome, both over the full 
period and since operational independence in 1997 Q2, as already reported in Goodhart (2004a). 
 The outcomes, however, have closely matched the target value of 2.5%; so the average value of 
column 5 has been negative (-0.25, S.E. 0.4 over full period, F.P.; -0.22, S.E. 0.36 since 
operational independence, OI).  Inflation was probably initially overestimated, until Q2 1996, 
because of an expectation of a greater pass-through (than actually occurred) onto domestic prices 
of the sharp devaluation of end 1992.  The other main period, when prospective inflation was 
initially over-forecast, was between 1998 Q3 and 1999 Q2.  This reflected a feeling in 1996 and 
early 1997 (before OI) that Chancellor Clarke had failed to raise interest rates enough.  With a 
combination of a subsequent strong rise in rates (note that the negative policy response in these 
quarters exceeds the unanticipated shocks) and the deflationary effect of the Asian crisis, this 
mini-surge in inflation was halted. 
 
The negative association between the policy response and the unanticipated forecast change 
remains, but somewhat less clearly marked than for output; the signs are opposite 22x, similar 
12x, (one sign is zero 2x, over FP; opposite 14x, similar 9x, zero 2x, under OI).  I would attribute 
the lower frequency of correct offsetting to the greater difficulty of doing so when the relevant 
lags are longer, and hence it is harder to predict how to adjust to offset in-coming shocks. 
 
That said, a similar regression, to wit,  
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Policy Changet = a + b Forecast Changet, 
has almost as strong and effective offsetting effect as with output: Thus 
 
a = 0.01 
(0.76)
 
b = -0.16 
(0.06)
 
R2 = 0.10
 
FP 
 
a = 0.01 
(0.83)
 
b = -0.26 
(0.07)
 
R2 = 0.14
 
OI 
 
The strength of the correct counter-vailing policy response has, apparently, increased since OI.  
The difficulty of forecasting shocks, that need offsetting, may well be the explanation of the low 
R2. 
 
Table 14 gives the pattern of forecast errors.  Simple inspection reveals that these also are 
positively auto-correlated, both downwards (forecasts of the same horizon for consecutive 
outcome periods) and horizontally (consecutive forecasts for the same outcome period), though 
not as strongly as with output. 
[Insert Table 14] 
 
As before we show this numerically for the first order autocorrelations. 
 
First order auto-correlations Bank RPI  
 
First order auto-correlations of the forecast errors going downwards: 
  
T= 
 
8 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0  
 
 
 
0.434 
 
0.356
 
0.530 
 
0.626
 
0.686
 
0.583
 
0.551
 
0.306
 
-0.162 
 
 
First order auto-correlations of forecast errors going horizontally: 
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T= 8/7 7/6 6/5 5/4 4/3 3/2 2/1 1/0  
 
 
 
0.882 
 
0.850 
 
0.818 
 
0.838 
 
0.857 
 
0.829 
 
0.833 
 
0.666 
 
Data: bank forecasts errors of the RPI  
 
 
Both sets of auto-correlations are lower than in the previous case for output errors.  Perhaps this 
difference, between output and inflation errors, has occurred because the mean-reverting 
tendencies, (including the policy response), for inflation during this period has been stronger 
(than for output); so a forecast that inflation will revert to target has been systematically wrong 
less frequently. 
 
So there are large and persistent changes to the forecasts made for the target variable (both 
inflation and output) for any particular date between the first occasion on which that 
variable/date was forecast (i.e. at the longest horizon t = 8) and on the occasion of the final 
forecast for that variable/date in the middle of its current quarter.  This is quantified in Columns 
8 (the final column) of Tables 9 and 10.  Intervening policy changes (quantified in Column 7) 
serve to offset a sizeable proportion, but not all, of the unanticipated forecast errors, so the actual 
forecast change between t = 8 and t = 0 (Column 5) is still positively correlated with, but varies 
less than, the unanticipated changes to the forecast. 
 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that (auto-correlated) forecast errors drive the 
autocorrelation in interest rate changes.  There may, however, be other reasons for such latter 
auto-correlations, (also known as gradualism, or stepping); we explore the possible contributions 
of such alternative explanatory factors in a separate paper (Goodhart 2004b). 
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IV.  Conclusions 
 
The record of the Bank forecasters in predicting output growth and inflation is good by the 
standard criteria of MAE, RMSE and unbiassedness.  Looking at this more closely, however, 
reveals that, since 1993, this has been because these forecasters have predicted that these 
variables would remain close to trend/target, and this has been broadly what has occurred.  If, 
instead, the criterion is whether the forecasters can predict deviations around the average 
trend/target, then the results have been dire.  In equations of the form Outcome = a + b Forecast, 
the values of R2 and of b have been approximately zero (rather than one) until the horizon has 
become fairly short (two, or three, quarters, or less). 
 
Superficially this may seem to represent forecast failure, but this would only be so if the 
forecasting process could not itself influence policy, which then drives the variables back to their 
desired target.  Indeed long-horizon values of R2 of zero may reflect an optimal forecast/policy 
procedure.  Only when the lag length is such as to make it impossible/undesirable to use the 
instrument to drive the objectives back to target should we see the values of R2 and b returning 
towards one. 
 
We then use our knowledge of the forecast path of interest rates (constant from the current level), 
together with a rule of thumb for the transmission mechanism of interest rates, to decompose the 
changes between the initial Bank forecast and the forecast at t = 0 (or outcome) into the 
cumulative effective policy response and the unanticipated change over time to the initial 
forecast.  We show that the policy response is usually correctly signed (i.e. offsets the 
unanticipated forecast change), but is too small on average to offset such shocks perfectly. 
 − 29 − 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Bank of England, (2004), `The new Bank of England Quarterly Model’, April, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mpc/qtlymodel.pdf. 
 
Bean, C., (2003), ` Asset Prices, Financial Imbalances and Monetary Policy: Are Inflation Targets 
Enough?’, presented at BIS Conference on Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the 
Business Cycle, Basel, Switzerland. 
 
Benati, L., (2003), ` Evolving Post-World War II UK Economic Performance’, Bank of England 
Working Paper, July. 
 
Buiter, W.H., (1984), ` Granger-Causality and Policy Effectiveness’, Economica, 51, (202), May, 
151-62. 
 
Carriero, A., Favero, C.A. and I. Kaminska, (2003), `Financial Factors, Macroeconomic 
Information and the Expectations Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates’, unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Diebold, F.X. and C. Li, (2003), ` Forecasting the Term Structure of Government Bond Yields’, 
NBER Working Paper 10048, (October). 
 
Duffee, G.R., (2002), `Term Premia and Interest Rate Forecasts in Affine Models’, Journal of 
Finance, (February), 405-443. 
 
Goodhart, C.A.E., (1999), ` Central Bankers and Uncertainty’, Keynes Lecture in Economics, 29 
October 1998, reprinted in Proceedings of the British Academy, 101, pp 229-271. 
 
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2001), `Monetary Transmission Lags and the Formulation of the Policy 
Decision on Interest Rates’, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, 83 (4) (July/August), 
165-181. 
 
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2004a), ` What is the Monetary Policy Committee Attempting to Achieve?’, 
paper presented at the Conference in Honour of C. Freedman, at the Bank of Canada, Ottawa, 
June 19/20, (2003) forthcoming in published proceedings 2004. 
 
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2004b), `Gradualism in the Adjustment of Official Interest Rates: Some 
Partial Explanations’, Work in progress, Financial Markets Group, London School of 
Economics, (March). 
 
King, M.A., (2000), ` Monetary Policy: Theory in Practice’, address to the joint luncheon of the 
American Economic Association and the American Finance Association, Boston Marriott Hotel, 
7 January 2000.  See Bank of England website, http://194.129.36.50/speeches/speech67.htm. 
 
McAdam, P. And J. Morgan, (2004), `The effects of Euro Area interest rate changes: evidence 
from macroeconomic models’, National Institute Economic Review, 187, (January), pp 93-103. 
Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England, (1999), `The Transmission Mechanism of 
 − 30 − 
 
Monetary Policy’, pamphlet, Bank of England. 
 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (2003/4), National Institute Economic 
Review, Nos 183-190. 
 
Orphanides, (1998), `Monetary policy rules based on real-time data’, Finance and Economics 
Discussion Paper no 98-3, Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
 
Rudebusch, G.D., (2002), `Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary 
Policy Inertia’, Journal of Monetary Economics, (September), 1161-1187.   
 
Rudebusch, G.D. and T. Wu, (2004), ` A Macro-Finance Model of the Term Structure, Monetary 
Policy and the Economy’, paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Conference on `Interest Rates and Monetary Policy’, March 19-20. 
 
Statistics Commission, (2004), Revisions to Economic Statistics; Vol. 1, Report by Statistics 
Commission; Vol. 2, Review by National Institute of Economic and Social Research; Vol. 3, 
Annexes, (London: Statistics Commission), (April). 
 
Thornton, D., (2004), `Testing the Expectations Hypothesis: Some New Evidence for Japan’, 
Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 2004-E-3, 
February. 
 
Tobin, J. (1970), `Money and Income: post hoc ergo propter hoc’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 84, (May), 301-17. 
 
Vickers, J., (1999), `Economic Models and Monetary Policy’, Speech to the Governors of the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), 18 March, reprinted in Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin [TBD]. 
 
Woodford, M., (2003), Interest and Prices, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
83 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 88 88 89 89 90 90 91 91 92 92 93 93 94 94 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 98 99 99 00 00 01 01 02 02 03 03 04
Interest ra
 
 Forecast 1
Forecast 2
Outturn
Chart 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Bank Forecast of GDP 
 Forecast t =  
 Output  
% growth  
2003 
estimate 
Output 
% growth
contemp-
oraneous
0 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1997 Q3 3.19 3.89 3.39         
Q4 3.36 3.93 4.02 2.82        
1998 Q1 3.38 2.88 3.04 3.54 2.37       
Q2 2.79 2.47 2.41 2.33 2.84 1.85      
Q3 3.51 2.40 1.99 1.86 1.76 2.11 1.80     
Q4 2.82 2.02 1.95 1.66 1.71 1.64 1.33 1.83    
1999 Q1 2.72 1.70 1.16 1.28 1.41 1.76 1.59 1.41 2.03   
Q2 2.61 1.64 0.79 0.77 1.00 1.19 1.83 1.79 1.64 2.38  
Q3 2.60 2.30 1.32 0.99 0.68 0.84 1.29 2.11 2.15 1.93 2.63 
Q4 3.26 2.75 2.50 1.90 1.20 0.83 1.01 1.54 2.27 2.41 2.33 
2000 Q1 3.96 3.11 2.92 2.82 2.41 1.49 1.36 1.33 1.69 2.39 2.61 
Q2 4.30 3.36 2.94 2.70 2.80 2.58 1.72 1.82 1.65 2.09 2.56 
Q3 3.94 2.98 2.56 2.58 2.47 2.51 2.73 1.99 2.24 2.02 2.44 
Q4 2.93 2.72 2.73 2.48 2.45 2.24 2.42 2.80 2.58 2.61 2.48 
2001 Q1 2.56 3.01 2.86 2.76 2.50 2.57 2.27 2.61 2.92 2.97 2.83 
Q2 2.23 2.65 2.25 2.30 2.39 2.51 2.61 2.35 2.70 3.01 3.11 
Q3 1.80 2.24 1.62 2.03 2.07 2.31 2.53 2.65 2.38 2.82 3.02 
Q4 1.95 1.71 2.09 1.82 2.46 2.22 2.40 2.63 2.70 2.39 2.83 
2002 Q1 1.44 1.37 1.37 1.92 1.98 2.68 2.10 2.48 2.81 2.74 2.39 
Q2 1.55 1.75 1.35 1.48 1.97 2.26 2.72 2.37 2.51 2.79 2.70 
Q3 1.93 2.26 1.82 1.62 1.78 2.05 2.42 2.71 2.62 2.50 2.76 
Q4 1.99 2.31 2.29 2.34 2.32 2.43 2.27 2.33 2.48 2.81 2.48 
2003 Q1 1.84 2.10 2.53 3.06 2.91 2.95 2.76 2.49 2.24 2.42 2.89 
Q2 1.98 1.84 2.38 2.58 3.18 2.75 2.95 2.79 2.66 2.15 2.42 
Q3 1.89 1.89 1.59 2.00 2.33 3.17 2.94 3.15 2.69 2.70 2.11 
 
 
Table 2 
Bank Forecast of RPIX 
      
  Forecast t =  
 
 
RPIX % change 
over 12 months 
0 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1993 Q1 3.50 3.50         
Q2 2.80 3.40 3.40        
Q3 3.30 2.90 3.40 3.00       
Q4 2.70 3.30 3.00 3.20 3.10      
1994 Q1 2.40 2.80 3.60 3.20 3.20 3.40     
Q2 2.40 2.70 3.00 3.50 3.30 3.50 3.40    
Q3 2.00 2.30 2.90 3.10 3.50 3.30 3.60 3.40   
Q4 2.50 2.10 2.60 3.00 3.20 3.40 3.30 3.70 3.30  
1995 Q1 2.80 2.90 1.90 2.70 3.10 3.40 3.40 3.50   
Q2 2.80 2.70 2.80 2.00 3.00 3.40 3.30 3.40 3.60  
Q3 3.10 2.90 3.00 3.10 2.30 3.20 3.40 3.20   
Q4 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.10 3.20 2.40 3.20 3.30 3.20  
1996 Q1 2.90 2.80 3.30 3.20 3.40 2.70 2.80 3.40 3.30  
Q2 2.80 2.70 2.70 3.50 3.50 3.80 2.70 2.40 3.10  
Q3 2.90 2.70 2.50 2.40 3.20 3.40 3.70 2.60 2.40  
Q4 3.10 3.10 2.40 2.30 2.20 3.00 3.20 3.40 2.50  
1997 Q1 2.70 2.70 2.90 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.70 2.90 3.00  
Q2 2.70 2.60 2.40 2.80 2.30 2.20 2.30 2.70 2.80  
Q3 2.70 2.65 2.40 2.20 2.70 2.40 2.40 2.30 2.70 2.80 
Q4 2.70 2.60 2.32 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.50 2.40 2.40 2.70 
1998 Q1 2.60 2.60 2.51 2.19 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.40 
Q2 2.80 2.83 2.63 2.42 2.06 2.20 2.50 2.50 2.70 2.50 
Q3 2.50 2.51 2.35 2.42 2.27 1.99 2.30 2.70 2.60 2.80 
Q4 2.60 2.54 2.56 2.35 2.41 2.19 2.08 2.50 2.80 2.70 
1999 Q1 2.70 2.49 2.56 2.69 2.41 2.44 2.18 2.24 2.70 2.90 
Q2 2.20 2.48 2.53 2.71 2.82 2.37 2.39 2.25 2.36 2.90 
Q3 2.10 2.31 2.40 2.55 2.74 2.86 2.30 2.47 2.37 2.50 
Q4 2.20 2.20 2.28 2.36 2.61 2.59 2.77 2.26 2.55 2.42 
2000 Q1 2.00 1.93 2.12 2.09 2.20 2.52 2.56 2.69 2.27 2.64 
Q2 2.20 1.88 1.98 2.06 1.99 2.23 2.49 2.51 2.56 2.35 
Q3 2.20 2.38 1.93 1.95 2.02 1.88 2.25 2.47 2.48 2.47 
Q4 2.00 2.36 2.28 2.10 2.05 1.84 1.92 2.23 2.47 2.45 
2001 Q1 1.90 1.94 2.33 2.26 2.20 2.32 1.72 2.08 2.35 2.56 
Q2 2.40 1.90 1.92 2.22 2.39 2.47 2.48 1.80 2.28 2.43 
Q3 2.30 2.31 1.90 1.87 2.19 2.48 2.53 2.53 2.19 2.59 
Q4 1.90 2.00 2.17 1.91 1.87 2.19 2.62 2.53 2.56 2.53 
2002 Q1 2.30 2.14 2.03 2.17 1.91 2.09 2.18 2.68 2.53 2.58 
Q2 1.50 2.02 1.87 1.85 1.91 1.94 2.18 2.37 2.70 2.56 
Q3 2.10 1.84 2.08 1.96 2.06 1.96 2.03 2.27 2.46 2.72 
Q4 2.70 2.64 2.25 2.24 2.11 2.06 2.13 2.16 2.42 2.56 
2003 Q1 3.00 2.77 2.73 2.25 2.18 2.13 2.08 2.32 2.39 2.55 
Q2 2.80 3.09 2.90 2.72 2.25 2.05 2.13 2.15 2.41 2.53 
Q3 2.80 2.85 2.90 2.98 2.72 2.31 2.09 2.18 2.23 2.45 
 
 
Table 3 
 
   Forecast at Horizon in Quarters 
            
 
Out-turn 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
Number of Obs 
1  Bank
RPI(X) 
Mean 
St Dev 
2.5 
0.4 
2.6 
0.4 
2.5 
0.4 
2.5 
0.5 
2.5 
0.5 
2.6 
0.5 
2.6 
0.5 
2.6 
0.5 
2.6 
0.3 
2.6 
0.2 
* 
about 40 
2  Bank
GDP  
Mean 
St Dev 
2.45 
0.7 
2.2 
0.8 
2.2 
0.7 
2.1 
0.6 
2.1 
0.6 
2.1 
0.6 
2.3 
0.5 
2.4 
0.4 
2.5 
0.3 
2.6 
0.3 
about 20 
 
* To be more precise, for the forecast of RPIX at t=0 there were 43 obs; at t=4 39 obs; at t=6 37 obs; at t=8 24 obs. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Predictive Ability of Forecasts for RPI 
 
I. Bank : Regression: Actual = a + bForecast(t+i) 
 
Data set: Bank RPI Forecast 
 
i= 
a 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
b 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
Rsq. DW Time Period 
 
0 
 
0.488 
(0.04) 
0.232 
0.801 
(0.00) 
0.089 
 
0.66 
 
2.20 
1993:Q1 
 
2003:Q3 
 
1 
 
1.31 
(0.00) 
0.300 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.116 
 
0.29 
 
1.20 
1993:Q2 
 
2003:Q3 
 
2 
 
1.61 
(0.00) 
0.311 
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.121 
 
0.18 
 
0.80 
1993:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
 
3 
 
1.92 
(0.00) 
0.302 
0.22 
(0.06) 
0.117 
 
0.08 
 
0.79 
1993:Q4 
 
2003:Q3 
 
4 
 
1.96 
(0.00) 
0.289 
0.20 
(0.07) 
0.111 
 
0.08 
 
0.66 
1994:Q1 
 
2003:Q3 
 
5 
 
1.83 
(0.00) 
0.311 
0.25 
(0.03) 
0.118 
 
0.11 
 
0.71 
1994:Q2 
 
2003:Q3 
 
6 
 
1.77 
(0.00) 
0.355 
0.27 
(0.04) 
0.133 
 
0.10 
 
0.68 
1994:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
 
7 
 
1.40 
(0.00) 
0.439 
0.41 
(0.01) 
0.163 
 
0.11 
 
0.82 
1994:Q4 
 
2003:Q3 
 
8 
 
1.52 
(0.25) 
1.297 
0.32 
(0.52) 
0.501 
 
0.01 
 
0.87 
1997:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
 
 
Table 5 
 
GDPActual = a + b Forecast (t+i) 
 
.i= 
a 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
b 
(p-value) 
St Er. 
Rsq. DW Time Period 
 
0 
 
0.71 
(0.00) 
0.21 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.09 
 
0.75 
 
1.09 
1997:3 
 
2003:3 
 
1 
 
1.15 
(0.00) 
0.35 
0.57 
(0.00) 
0.15 
 
0.38 
 
0.84 
1997:4 
 
2003:3 
 
2 
 
1.81 
(0.00) 
0.39 
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.18 
 
0.07 
 
0.47 
1998:1 
 
2003:3 
 
3 
 
2.41 
(0.00) 
0.42 
-0.05 
(0.77) 
0.19 
 
0.00 
 
0.43 
1998:2 
 
2003:3 
 
4 
 
2.71 
(0.00) 
0.46 
-0.19 
(0.35) 
0.20 
 
0.04 
 
0.43 
1998:3 
 
2003:3 
 
5 
 
2.95 
(0.00) 
0.58 
-0.29 
(0.25) 
0.25 
 
0.07 
 
0.45 
1998:4 
 
2003:3 
 
6 
 
3.23 
(0.00) 
0.82 
-0.39 
(0.26) 
0.34 
 
0.07 
 
0.45 
1999:1 
 
2003:3 
 
7 
 
3.03 
(0.01) 
1.10 
-0.28 
(0.53) 
0.43 
 
0.02 
 
0.46 
1999:2 
 
2003:3 
 
8 
 
1.90 
(0.21) 
1.45 
0.17 
(0.75) 
0.55 
 
0.00 
 
0.35 
1999:3 
 
2003:3 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Assumed Effects of Interest Rate Changes on 
 
GDP 
Quarters after Change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
0 0.12 0.21 0.3 0.35 
(0.32) 
0.35 
(0.30)
0.29 
(0.24)
0.25 
(0.12)
0.16 
(0.03
) 
1% change 
0 0 0.1 0.1 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.07)
0.07 
(0.05)
0.06 
(0.03)
0.04 
(0.01
) 
¼% change 
  
RPI 
Quarters after Change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
0 0 0 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.3 1% change 
0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 ¼% 
change 
 
 
Interest Rate Changes in Months applied to Quarters 
Dec - Feb Q1 
Mar-May Q2 
June - Aug Q3 
Sept - Nov Q4 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Effect on RPIX 
Date Interest Change         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum
1993 Q1           -1.00 
Q2           
Q3           
Q4 -0.50           
1994 Q1           -0.25 
Q2           
Q3           -0.02 -0.25 -0.27
Q4           0.50 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07
1995 Q1           0.50 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13
Q2           -0.05 -0.12 -0.17
Q3           0.02 -0.06 -0.04
Q4           -0.25 0.02 0.06 0.08
1996 Q1           -0.25 0.06 0.10 0.16
Q2           0.10 0.12 0.22
Q3          -0.25 -0.01 0.12 0.11
Q4           0.25 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
1997 Q1            -0.03 -0.05 -0.08
Q2           0.25 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12
Q3       0.75 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16
Q4          0.25 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10
1998 Q1            0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.00
Q2           0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.04
Q3           0.25 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.22
Q4          -0.75 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.23
1999 Q1           -1.25 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.31
Q2          -0.25 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.31
Q3          -0.25 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08
Q4          0.50 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08
2000 Q1 0.50    -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.06  -0.23 
Q2           -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 -0.18 0.08 -0.37
Q3           0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.31 -0.24 -0.61
Q4           0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.38 -0.41
2001 Q1           -0.25 0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.08 0.01
Q2          -0.50 0.09 0.12 -0.08 0.13
Q3          -0.25 0.12 0.16 0.28
Q4          -1.00 -0.01 0.16 0.15
2002 Q1            -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
Q2           -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12
Q3           -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22
Q4           -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.36
2003 Q1           -0.25 -0.18 -0.06 -0.16 -0.40
Q2           -0.25 -0.08 -0.33
Q3         -0.25 -0.32 -0.32 
 
Table 8 
 
Effect on GDP 
Date Interest Change 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1997 Q3 0.75 0.03 0.03  0.07 -0.09  -0.07 -0.06 
Q4 0.25 0.01 0.09 0.05  0.09 -0.09  -0.06 
1998 Q1  0.03 0.15 0.07  0.09 -0.07  
Q2   0.05 0.21 0.09  0.07 -0.06 
Q3 0.25 0.01   0.07 0.26 0.09  0.06 
Q4 -0.75 -0.03 0.03   0.09 0.25 0.07  
1999 Q1 -1.25 -0.04 -0.09 0.05   0.09 0.21 0.06 
Q2 -0.25 -0.01 -0.15 -0.15 0.07   0.07 0.18 
Q3 -0.25 -0.01 -0.03 -0.26 -0.21 0.09   0.06 
Q4 0.50 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.37 -0.26 0.09   
2000 Q1 0.50 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.44 -0.25 0.07  
Q2  0.06 0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.44 -0.21 0.06 
Q3   0.10 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.36 -0.18 
Q4    0.14 0.18 -0.09 -0.07 -0.31 
2001 Q1 -0.25 -0.01    0.18 0.18 -0.07 -0.06 
Q2 -0.50 -0.02 -0.03    0.18 0.14 -0.06 
Q3 -0.25 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05    0.14 0.12 
Q4 -1.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07    0.12 
2002 Q1  -0.12 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09    
Q2     -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.09 
Q3    -0.30 -0.09 -0.18 -0.07  
Q4     -0.35 -0.09 -0.19 -0.06 
2003 Q1 -0.25 -0.01     -0.35 -0.07 -0.12 
Q2  -0.03     -0.29 -0.06 
Q3 -0.25 -0.01  -0.05     -0.25 
 

 
Table 9 
RPIX Summary Statistics 
 
RPI 
Date Actual Dif Fcast t=0 Dif Fcast 
t=7/8 
Policy 
change 
Fcast 
change 
1994 Q3 2.00 -0.30 2.30     
Q4 2.50 0.40 2.10 -1.20 3.30 0.07 -1.27 
1995 Q1 2.80 -0.10 2.90 -0.60 3.50 0.13 -0.73 
Q2 2.80 0.10 2.70 -0.90 3.60 0.17 -1.07 
Q3 3.10 0.20 2.90 -0.30 3.20 0.04 -0.34 
Q4 3.00 -0.20 3.20 0.00 3.20 -0.08 0.08 
1996 Q1 2.90 0.10 2.80 -0.50 3.30 -0.16 -0.34 
Q2 2.80 0.10 2.70 -0.40 3.10 -0.22 -0.62 
Q3 2.90 0.20 2.70 0.30 2.40 -0.11 0.41 
Q4 3.10 0.00 3.10 0.60 2.50 0.04 0.56 
1997 Q1 2.70 0.00 2.70 -0.30 3.00 0.08 -0.38 
Q2 2.70 0.10 2.60 -0.20 2.80 0.12 -0.32 
Q3 2.70 0.05 2.65 -0.15 2.80 0.16 -0.31 
Q4 2.70 0.10 2.60 -0.10 2.70 0.13 -0.23 
1998 Q1 2.60 0.00 2.60 0.20 2.40 0.00 0.20 
Q2 2.80 -0.03 2.83 0.33 2.50 -0.04 0.37 
Q3 2.50 -0.01 2.51 -0.29 2.80 -0.22 -0.07 
Q4 2.60 0.06 2.54 -0.16 2.70 -0.23 0.07 
1999 Q1 2.70 0.21 2.49 -0.41 2.90 -0.31 -0.10 
Q2 2.20 -0.28 2.48 -0.42 2.90 -0.31 -0.11 
Q3 2.10 -0.21 2.31 -0.19 2.50 -0.08 -0.11 
Q4 2.20 0.00 2.20 -0.22 2.42 0.08 -0.14 
2000 Q1 2.00 0.07 1.93 -0.71 2.64 0.23 -0.94 
Q2 2.20 0.32 1.88 -0.47 2.35 0.37 -0.84 
Q3 2.20 -0.18 2.38 -0.09 2.47 0.61 -0.70 
Q4 2.00 -0.36 2.36 -0.09 2.45 0.41 -0.50 
2001 Q1 1.90 -0.04 1.94 -0.61 2.56 -0.01 -0.60 
Q2 2.40 0.50 1.90 -0.53 2.43 -0.13 -0.40 
Q3 2.30 -0.01 2.31 -0.28 2.59 -0.28 0.00 
Q4 1.90 -0.10 2.00 -0.53 2.53 -0.15 -0.38 
2002 Q1 2.30 0.16 2.14 -0.44 2.58 0.05 -0.49 
Q2 1.50 -0.52 2.02 -0.54 2.56 0.12 -0.66 
Q3 2.10 0.26 1.84 -0.88 2.72 0.22 -1.10 
Q4 2.70 0.06 2.64 -0.08 2.56 0.36 -0.44 
2003 Q1 3.00 0.23 2.77 0.22 2.55 0.40 -0.18 
Q2 2.80 -0.29 3.09 0.56 2.53 0.33 0.23 
Q3 2.80 -0.05 2.85 0.40 2.45 0.32 0.08 
 
 
Table 10 
GDP Summary Statistics 
 
GDP        
Date Actual Dif Fcast  
t = 0 
Dif Fcast 
t = 8 
Policy 
change 
Fcast 
change 
1999 Q3 2,30 0,98 1,32 -1,31 2,63 0,36 -1,67 
Q4 2,75 0,25 2,50 0,27 2,33 0,60 -0,87 
2000 Q1 3,11 0,19 2,92 0,31 2,61 0,66 -0,97 
Q2 3,36 0,42 2,94 0,28 2,56 0,59 -0,31 
Q3 2,98 0,42 2,56 0,12 2,44 0,48 -0,36 
Q4 2,72 -0,01 2,73 0,25 2,48 0,15 0,10 
2001 Q1 3,01 0,15 2,86 0,03 2,83 -0,22 0,25 
Q2 2,65 0,40 2,25 -0,86 3,11 -0,21 -0,65 
Q3 2,24 0,62 1,62 -0,40 3,02 -0,14 -0,26 
Q4 1,71 -0,38 2,09 -0,74 2,83 0,11 -0,85 
2002 Q1 1,37 0,00 1,37 -1,02 2,39 0,40 -1,42 
Q2 1,75 0,40 1,35 -1,35 2,70 0,55 -1,90 
Q3 2,26 0,44 1,82 -0,94 2,76 0,64 -1,58 
Q4 2,31 0,02 2,29 -0,17 2,48 0,69 -0,86 
2003 Q1 2,10 -0,43 2,53 -0,46 2,89 0,55 -1,01 
Q2 1,84 -0,54 2,38 -0,04 2,42 0,38 -0,42 
Q3 1,89 0,30 1,59 -0,52 2,11 0,31 -0,83 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
 
Policy Change: 
 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.7956 0.8309 24.109 0 
2 0.4012 -0.6516 30.427 0 
3 -0.0289 -0.1565 30.461 0 
4 -0.3975 -0.3703 37.06 0 
5 -0.5712 0.0997 51.144 0 
6 -0.5364 -0.1128 63.993 0 
7 -0.3394 -0.0046 69.32 0 
 
 
Forecast Change: 
 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.4956 0.5107 9.3543 0.0022 
2 0.1499 -0.1262 10.236 0.006 
3 0.0445 0.1196 10.316 0.0161 
4 0.0161 -0.091 10.326 0.0353 
5 -0.0211 -0.1294 10.346 0.066 
6 0.0412 0.118 10.422 0.108 
7 -0.1183 -0.4805 11.068 0.1357 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
(i) Difference Forecast t = 8 less Forecast t = 0 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.4236 0.4237 3.6232 0.057 
2 0.2411 -0.0584 4.8746 0.0874 
3 0.0506 -0.1661 4.9337 0.1767 
4 -0.0757 -0.1427 5.0762 0.2796 
5 -0.2758 -0.3381 7.1239 0.2116 
6 -0.4294 -0.6053 12.539 0.051 
 
of which 
(ii) Policy Change: 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.8159 0.8268 13.439 0.0002 
2 0.3768 -0.883 16.497 0.0003 
3 -0.1269 0.0916 16.869 0.0008 
4 -0.5186 0.0036 23.551 0.0001 
5 -0.6775 0.332 35.908 0 
6 -0.5977 0.2028 46.399 0 
 
(iii) Forecast Change: 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.5301 0.53 5.6738 0.0172 
2 0.3145 -0.09 7.8037 0.0202 
3 0.0553 -0.2344 7.8743 0.0487 
4 -0.1711 -0.2065 8.6013 0.0719 
5 -0.4023 -0.4147 12.958 0.0238 
6 -0.517 -0.7485 20.808 0.002 
 
 
 
Table 13 
GDP Bank 
 
  Diffferential between GDP and forecast 
 
 
GDP % 
change 
over 12 
months 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Q3 3.89 0.50         
Q4 3.93 -0.09 1.11        
1998 Q1 2.88 -0.16 -0.66 0.51       
Q2 2.47 0.06 0.14 -0.37 0.62      
Q3 2.40 0.41 0.54 0.64 0.29 0.60     
Q4 2.02 0.07 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.69 0.19    
1999 Q1 1.70 0.54 0.42 0.29 -0.06 0.11 0.29 -0.33   
Q2 1.64 0.85 0.87 0.64 0.45 -0.19 -0.15 0.00 -0.74  
Q3 2.30 0.98 1.31 1.62 1.46 1.01 0.19 0.15 0.37 -0.33 
Q4 2.75 0.25 0.85 1.55 1.92 1.74 1.21 0.48 0.34 0.42 
2000 Q1 3.11 0.19 0.29 0.70 1.62 1.75 1.78 1.42 0.72 0.50 
Q2 3.36 0.42 0.66 0.56 0.78 1.64 1.54 1.71 1.27 0.80 
Q3 2.98 0.42 0.40 0.51 0.47 0.25 0.99 0.74 0.96 0.54 
Q4 2.72 -0.01 0.24 0.27 0.48 0.30 -0.08 0.14 0.11 0.24 
2001 Q1 3.01 0.15 0.25 0.51 0.44 0.74 0.40 0.09 0.04 0.18 
Q2 2.65 0.40 0.35 0.26 0.14 0.04 0.30 -0.05 -0.36 -0.46 
Q3 2.24 0.62 0.21 0.17 -0.07 -0.29 -0.41 -0.14 -0.58 -0.78 
Q4 1.71 -0.38 -0.11 -0.75 -0.51 -0.69 -0.92 -0.99 -0.68 -1.12 
2002 Q1 1.37 0.00 -0.55 -0.61 -1.31 -0.73 -1.11 -1.44 -1.37 -1.02 
Q2 1.75 0.40 0.27 -0.22 -0.51 -0.97 -0.62 -0.76 -1.04 -0.95 
Q3 2.26 0.44 0.64 0.48 0.21 -0.16 -0.45 -0.36 -0.24 -0.50 
Q4 2.31 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.02 -0.17 -0.50 -0.17 
2003 Q1 2.10 -0.43 -0.96 -0.81 -0.85 -0.66 -0.39 -0.14 -0.32 -0.79 
Q2 1.84 -0.54 -0.74 -1.34 -0.91 -1.11 -0.95 -0.82 -0.31 -0.58 
Q3 1.89 0.30 -0.11 -0.44 -1.28 -1.05 -1.26 -0.80 -0.81 -0.22 
 
 
Table 14 
 
  Differential between RPIX and forecast 
 
 
  
RPIX % 
change 
over 12 
months 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1993         3.50 0.00 
Q2 2.80 -0.6 -0.60        
Q3 3.30 0.40 -0.10 0.30       
Q4 2.70 -0.60 -0.30 -0.50 -0.40      
1994 Q1 2.40 -0.40 -1.20 -0.80 -0.80 -1.00     
Q2 2.40 -0.30 -0.60 -1.10 -0.90 -1.10 -1.00    
Q3 2.00 -0.30 -0.90 -1.10 -1.50 -1.30 -1.60 -1.40   
Q4 2.50 0.40 -0.10 -0.50 -0.70 -0.90 -0.80 -1.20 -0.80  
1995 Q1 2.80 -0.10 0.90 0.10 -0.30 -0.60 -0.60 -0.70   
Q2 2.80 0.10 0.00 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 -0.50 -0.60 -0.80  
Q3 3.10 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.80 -0.10 -0.30 -0.10   
Q4 3.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 -0.20 0.60 -0.20 -0.30 -0.20  
1996 Q1 2.90 0.10 -0.40 -0.30 -0.50 0.20 0.10 -0.50 -0.40  
Q2 2.80 0.10 0.10 -0.70 -0.70 -1.00 0.10 0.40 -0.30  
Q3 2.90 0.20 0.40 0.50 -0.30 -0.50 -0.80 0.30 0.50  
Q4 3.10 0.00 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.10 -0.10 -0.30 0.60  
1997 Q1 2.70 0.00 -0.20 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00 -0.20 -0.30  
Q2 2.70 0.10 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.00 -0.10  
Q3 2.70 0.05 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.00 -0.10 
Q4 2.70 0.10 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.00 
1998 Q1 2.60 0.00 0.09 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 
Q2 2.80 -0.03 0.17 0.38 0.74 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.30 
Q3 2.50 -0.01 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.51 0.20 -0.20 -0.10 -0.30 
Q4 2.60 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.41 0.52 0.10 -0.20 -0.10 
1999 Q1 2.70 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.29 0.26 0.52 0.46 0.00 -0.20 
Q2 2.20 -0.28 -0.33 -0.51 -0.62 -0.17 -0.19 -0.05 -0.16 -0.70 
Q3 2.10 -0.21 -0.30 -0.45 -0.64 -0.76 -0.20 -0.37 -0.27 -0.40 
Q4 2.20 0 -0.08 -0.16 -0.41 -0.39 -0.57 -0.06 -0.35 -0.22 
2000 Q1 2.00 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.20 -0.52 -0.56 -0.69 -0.27 -0.64 
Q2 2.20 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.21 -0.03 -0.29 -0.31 -0.36 -0.15 
Q3 2.20 -0.18 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.32 -0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 
Q4 2.00 -0.36 -0.28 -0.10 -0.05 0.16 0.08 -0.23 -0.47 -0.45 
2001 Q1 1.90 -0.04 -0.43 -0.36 -0.30 -0.42 0.18 -0.18 -0.45 -0.66 
Q2 2.40 0.50 0.48 0.18 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.60 0.12 -0.03 
Q3 2.30 -0.01 0.40 0.43 0.11 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23 0.11 -0.29 
Q4 1.90 -0.10 -0.27 -0.01 0.03 -0.29 -0.72 -0.63 -0.66 -0.63 
2002 Q1 2.30 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.39 0.21 0.12 -0.38 -0.23 -0.28 
Q2 1.50 -0.52 -0.37 -0.35 -0.41 -0.44 -0.68 -0.87 -1.20 -1.06 
Q3 2.10 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.07 -0.17 -0.36 -0.62 
Q4 2.70 0.06 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.28 0.14 
2003 Q1 3.00 0.23 0.27 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.68 0.61 0.45 
Q2 2.80 -0.29 -0.10 0.08 0.55 0.75 0.67 0.65 0.39 0.27 
Q3 2.80 -0.05 -0.10 -0.18 0.08 0.49 0.71 0.62 0.57 0.35 
 
